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Fictional expectations and the global media in the 
Greek debt crisis: A topic modeling approach 
 





We study the role of global media during the Greek debt crisis and relate it to the transmission of events 
on financial actors' expectations. To identify news coverage about the Greek debt crisis, we apply topic 
modeling to a newly compiled dataset of over 430,000 articles from The International New York Times and 
Financial Times from 2009 to 2015. We identify a Greek debt crisis topic and relate it to events concerning 
Greece during this time period. Our finding is that events are only relevant for financial markets when they 
are covered in the media, whereas events without media coverage have no effect. News coverage without 
immediate events is equally irrelevant for financial markets. 
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Expectations on financial markets permanently update with each new situation and under changing 
conditions. The media seem to play a crucial role in influencing expectations about future states: They 
inform about events and stories, highlight certain aspects and create their own images and narratives. 
They influence financial actors’ expectations through both information and narration. According to the 
sociologist Jens Beckert, the mass media provide a forum for financial market analysts to constitute and 
maintain investors’ expectations regarding the future value of financial securities.1 
But did stories and news in the global media matter in the development of the Greek debt crisis since 
2009? Beckert states that shocks like Mario Draghi's famous expectation “and believe me it will be enough” 
influenced credit conditions of countries like Portugal and Greece to a large part by the immediate 
transmission to financial markets via the mass media.2 While economic fundamentals remained 
unchanged, Mario Draghi created a new, alternative image of the future that prevailed for two reasons. 
First, owing to his position as head of the European central bank, Draghi had the instruments of monetary 
policy at his disposal necessary to take adequate measures. Second, the knowledge that the speech was 
transmitted by the global mass media to the global public made it a more effective tool for Draghi to create 
a new prospect of the future and added credibility to his statement in the eyes of the audience. While it is 
clear that important speeches of powerful people are often attributed relevance in many areas, it is the 
media that highlight this relevance and inform the recipients immediately and globally, and which then 
react to a new outlook of the future. The media’s selection also signals importance.  Draghi’s speech, 
together with the media coverage about it, created a new image among economic agents and thus 
provoked actions on financial markets. This episode points to the relevance of the media for the 
transmission of events to financial markets during the Greek debt crisis. The reactions to the speech would 
have supposedly been different with a different type, tone or narrative of media coverage. Observing a 
wide array of events, it would, however, be important to generalize the role of the media in the process 
of shaping financial expectations. 
In this article, we propose a quantitative measure of media coverage as a way to capture the impact of the 
media, which we then relate to financial markets’ expectations. For this purpose, we first quantitatively 
                                                          
1 J. Beckert, Imagined futures: fictional expectations and capitalist dynamics. Harvard University Press, 2016. p. 91. 
2 J. Beckert, Woher kommen Erwartungen?, MPIfG Discussion Paper 17/17, 2017, p 11. 
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analyze coverage about the Greek debt crisis in the global media. We apply the novel approach of topic 
modeling to a newly compiled large dataset of over 430,000 newspaper articles from The International 
New York Times and Financial Times over the period from 2009 to 2015.3 This is one of the largest datasets 
of news articles to which topic models have been applied thus far. By topic models, we classify the text 
data into a total number of 200 topics. We identify a single topic that clearly relates the country of Greece 
to financial terms and crisis terms and thus represents news coverage about the Greek debt crisis in global 
newspapers. We read a large number of articles with a high share of the topic and conclude that the Greek 
debt crisis topic series contains sufficient information to act as a proxy for global news coverage about the 
Greek debt crisis. We propose this proxy as a quantified factor of the mass media of financial actors’ 
expectations. 
Next, we compare the Greek debt crisis topic share over time with a timeline of events of the Greek debt 
crisis. We relate a majority of events during the crisis to dates with high news coverage. We find some 
events without news coverage in the global newspapers, and some dates with news coverage but without 
events. We then test the effect of events and news coverage about the Greek debt crisis on financial 
markets. 
Our finding is that events are only relevant for financial markets when they go along with media coverage. 
Our measure of media coverage of the Greek debt crisis is positively correlated with financial markets’ 
expectations, for which we use the interest rate on Greek bonds as a proxy. Events that are covered in the 
news entail significant changes on financial markets. We find no such effect for news without media 
coverage. Our finding that only events covered in the media entail an effect on financial markets while 
other events do not, points to our hypothesis that financial markets indeed depend on media coverage. 
This finding suggests an “information effect” of media. The media inform financial markets about relevant 
events, that otherwise would have not reached them. We find a relevant information effect when 
classifying dates into “good news” and “bad news” for Greece. We further propose examining a possible 
“narration effect” of media, namely the impact that the media have by narrating stories beyond the pure 
facts and new information. We achieve this by testing the effect of dates with high news coverage, but 
without events on the Greek interest rate. We find no effect of such dates. 
                                                          
3 Topic Modeling has been proposed to analyze large text datasets by D. Blei/ A. Y. Ng/ M. I. Jordan, Latent Dirichlet 





The question of whether the media have an impact on financial markets has been broadly discussed in the 
economic and financial literature.4 This literature treats the media typically as a provider of information 
and creator of sentiments to identify information shocks by media coverage. In this article, we focus on 
mass media as a transmission mechanism between real-world events in the Greek debt crisis and financial 
markets. 
The mass media produce biases according to their rationality. According to Luhmann, mass media select 
by the code information/non-information and not by truth/non-truth.5 This implies that the mass media 
focus on discontinuities, quantities and conflicts. Mass media thus report about events rather than 
complex processes. In addition to the highly selective image of the world which the mass media sketch, 
they frame the information and thus bias the image. On the one hand, they refer to past events and embed 
them into a narrative context. On the other hand, the expression of opinions regulates meaning and 
interpretation of events before and after their occurrence. Such opinions also frame events and keep 
stories in the news. The source of opinion must have a remarkable reputation qua position or person, but 
frequent citations in mass media also strengthen the reputation of the source.6 
There are also more hidden selection manners: categorization as describing specific issues in general terms 
and causal attribution. The latter describes the causes and consequences of a phenomenon by picking 
particular causes/consequences and excluding other causes/consequences or causes of the causes or 
consequences of the consequences. As a result, it is impossible for mass media to reflect the world in a 
complete and unbiased way.7 Luhmann states: “The description of the world and of society to which 
modern society orients itself within and outside the system of its mass media arise as a factual effect of 
this circular permanent activity of generating und interpreting irritation through information tied to a 
particular moment (that is, as a difference which makes a difference).”8 Hence, mass media’s biased and 
                                                          
4 See for example A. Groß-Klußmann/ N. Hautsch, When machines read the news: Using automated text analytics 
to quantify high frequency news-implied market reactions, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011, pp. 
321–340; P. C. Tetlock, Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the stock market, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2007, pp. 1139–1168; T. P. Wisniewski/ B. Lambe, The role of media in the credit crunch: 
The case of the banking sector, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2013, pp. 163–175. 
5 N. Luhmann, The reality of the mass media, Standford University Press, 2000, pp. 17-19. 
6 Ibid. pp. 28-35.  
7 Ibid. p. 77. It should be noted that in line with Luhmann’s radical constructivism nobody has an unbiased 
perception of the reality. 
8 lbid. p. 98. 
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selected coverage generates resonance to its environment, which may become the subject of future 
coverage. Thus, this constructed present guaranteed by mass media is given for all function systems and 
individuals in society. Based on this reality, the function systems and individuals create their expectations.9 
This leads us to Jens Beckert’s theory of fictional expectations.10 Fictional expectations imply that all 
knowledge about the present cannot tell us anything about the future, because the future is open and 
contingent. Expectations about the future are fictional in the sense that we imagine how the circumstances 
could be and then act as if this imagined future will happen. Such fictional expectations motivate the action 
of all individuals and are also contingent. Therefore, expectations can become objects of powerful agents’ 
attempts to shift the future in their favor. But shaping of expectation on a large scale is not possible 
without the mass media. To effectively reach public expectations news need to be covered by the media. 
With respect to financial markets, an important factor is credibility. As Beckert argues, creditworthiness is 
at the center of investors' decisions. Since narratives are spread by the mass media to a larger public, the 
media can play a crucial role in the translation of rumors and threats to financial markets. Financial actors 
then act in anticipation of other actors knowledge given the assumed information set based on media 
reports.11 
As Robert Shiller stresses, the media and financial markets practically maintain a mutual loving 
relationship: The media loves financial markets because markets constantly provide new numbers as 
reactions to shocks and anticipated events. Investors read and refer to news events (events that are 
covered in the media) when making their investment decisions. Investors take decisions according to new 
information, as well as narratives about prospected high profits and low risks in the future. Such narratives 
are regularly taken from reports in the global media, partly because commonly-available information 
allows anticipating the interpretations of other actors. The media however, is likewise dependent on 
potentially influential agents, that provide the media’s reports with a certain degree of credibility.12 
With respect to Greece, the way in which the media covered the debt crisis potentially influenced financial 
markets beyond the sole information about actual events. News reports about Greece, particularly the 
selection of events covered and the way in which the crisis and the country of Greece were communicated 
                                                          
9 Ibid. p. 99. 
10 J. Beckert, Capitalism as a System of Expectations, Politics & Society, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2013, pp. 323–350; J. Beckert, 
Capitalist Dynamics Fictional Expectations and the Openness of the Future, MPIfG Discussion Paper, Vol. 14/7, 
2014; J. Beckert, Imagined futures: fictional expectations and capitalist dynamics. Harvard University Press, 2016. 
11 Beckert, Imagined futures, pp. 119-129. 
12 R. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 3rd edition Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 108-110. 
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in media reports, presumably shaped investors' expectations. The many news articles potentially shaped 
the perception about Greece so drastically that Greece was assigned the image of a suspicious third world 
country.13 The long sequence of negative events in the period from 2009 to 2012 then further cultivated 
the image of a failed state at Europe's periphery. 
Following this line of reasoning, it is useful to empirically examine the role that media coverage plays in 
informing about events and contributing to the narration. With respect to information, it seems plausible 
that the media plays an important role in transmitting the relevant news and events to financial markets, 
while potentially overlooking the less important news. Hence, the events that the media informs about 
matter for financial markets. Other events are, however, filtered out by the media and therefore cannot 
update the set of information financial actors have. A possible coverage selection may occur in anticipatory 
obedience as part of the mutual loving affair between the two. We would also expect a resonance on 
financial markets due to the media’s selection bias described by Luhmann. An event not transmitted by 
the media would not be perceived as new information. For the Greek debt crisis, we thus propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Events are transmitted to financial markets via the media. Events covered in the media affect 
financial markets, while events not covered in the news do not affect financial markets. 
With respect to narration, it is important to disentangle the impact of media coverage from the possible 
distorting effects of events. Both may play a role at the same time. However, if the media should affect 
financial expectations apart from the informing actors, we should observe a reaction after media reports 
without actual events. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: Narration matters. Financial markets react to media coverage about the Greek debt crisis 
on dates without events.   
                                                          
13 Which may be in the sense of R. J. Shiller, Narrative economics, American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 4, 
2017, pp. 967–1004. 
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3 Topic models – a quantitative measure of global media 
coverage 
 
In order to analyze the effect of news coverage about the Greek debt crisis in global media, we make use 
of the novel method of topic modeling.14 Topic models allow classifying large text datasets into topical 
content categories. We compare the discovered topics and identify a Greek debt crisis topic. Furthermore, 
we cumulate the probabilities of this topic to obtain a quantitative measure of the news coverage about 
the Greek debt crisis in global newspapers.  
 
3.1 Topic Models 
Topic modeling has a number of advantages over conventional text analysis techniques. It allows a broad 
overview of large text corpora and discovers the main themes in a collection of text data. By this, we are 
able to make comparisons between texts and collections without ever being able to read through all of 
them - not to mention manually analyze or codify them. For our purpose, it allows us to identify news 
articles about the Greek debt crisis in a large corpus (e.g. a text dataset) of over 430,000 articles. We are 
further able to employ topic probabilities from the topic model as a quantifiable measure of the extent of 
news coverage in articles over time.  
Another benefit of topic models is that we impose no restrictions on the words or documents. We do not 
search for particular terms like “Greek”, “debt” and “crisis” within our dataset of articles. Such a search 
for particular phrases could potentially miss articles that only talk about “Athens”, “credit” and “bailout”. 
Instead, topic models reveal the distinct relation of all words within all documents in the text collection. 
In each topic some words occur relatively more often together than other words. By this assumption, we 
identify whole groups or even all words in our vocabulary to contain a particular topical content. With 
respect to our research question, various word combinations from the fields of “Finance”, “Greece”, and 
“Crisis” point to topical content related to the Greek debt crisis. 15 
One way to apply topic models is via the statistical model referred to as latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA). 
In order to apply LDA, we assume that documents are mixtures of topics. A topic is a distribution over 
                                                          
14 Blei et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, pp. 993–1022. 
15 D. M. Blei/ J. D. Lafferty, Topic Models. CRC Press, 2009; D. Blei, Probabilistic Topic Models, Communications of 
the ACM, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2012, pp. 77–84. 
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terms (or words). Each term has a probability in each topic. Some terms occur relatively more often 
together in some documents than other terms. This translates into higher probabilities of such terms in 
the same topic.16 
 
Figure 1: Article with topics highlighted by colors 
 
Financial Times, April 4th, 2015. Hypothetical topics highlighted by colors (added by the authors).17 
 
Figure 1 provides an example of topics in a document. The text is an opinion article concerned with the 
Greek debt crisis taken from the Financial Times from April 4th, 2012. We highlighted four topics in four 
different shades of gray (from dark to light: dark gray; gray; light gray; very light gray). For instance, the 
dark gray topic comprises the words “economy”, “devalue” and “deflation”. The gray topic comprises the 
terms “Greece”, “Greek”, “minister” and “government” etc. Given the words in each topic, we could 
denote each topic by a meaningful name: dark gray topic = “economy”, gray topic = “Greece”, light gray 
topic = “debt”, very light gray topic = “risk”. 
                                                          
16 Blei et al, Latent Dirichlet Allocation. 
17 Figure related to Blei, Probabilistic Topic Models. 
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Regarding the document-generating process, we assume that an author who writes a document first 
chooses the proportion of topics to be included in the text. We can imagine that the choice of topic 
proportions is determined by what the author intends to write about. The author then creates the text by 
drawing words from the topic distributions given the probability of each word in each topic and the 
author's desired topic proportions in the document. We further assume that the topic distributions exist 
before the author begins to write. Accordingly, they are known to the author and are independent from 
the author’s decisions about the topics in the document. 
 
Figure 2: The document-generating process: Topic distributions (left), documents with color-coded topics 
(center) and the topic proportion of the text (right) 
 
Left-hand side: exemplary topic distributions of four topics; middle: exemplary document with topics 
highlighted by colors; right-hand side: exemplary topic proportions of the document. Colored dotes 
represent the author's word draws according to topic distributions and proportions. The drawn words are 
then placed into the text. Source: Financial Times, April 4th, 2015.18    
          
                                                          
18 Figure related to Blei, Probabilistic Topic Models. 
11 
 
To illustrate the process of document-generation more precisely, Figure 2 provides an overview of the 
hypothetical creation of the article about the Greek debt crisis discussed before. On the left-hand side, the 
topic distributions are denoted as lists of words ordered by probabilities. The topics exist before the article 
is created. Each word has a probability in each topic, whereby some words are much more likely to be part 
of one topic than the other. On the right-hand side, we indicate the topic proportions of the text chosen 
by the author. Regarding the article in the center, we could, for instance, assume, that the author had the 
idea to write about Greece, the debt crisis and economic affairs, before he began to write the article. 
Accordingly, he chose the topic proportions of the text. The author then created the text by randomly 
choosing words from the topic distributions given the topic proportions. In the center of Figure 2, we 
illustrate this process for a few topics and words by the colored dots, words and arrows. The author has 
chosen that the article should predominantly comprise the light gray, gray and dark gray topics. He picks 
words from these distributions and places them into the text. 
 
Figure 3: LDA infers topic distributions and topic proportions solely from the words in the documents 
 
Only the documents are observed: Topic distributions, word assignments and topic proportions need to be 
inferred via the LDA. The words in each document are transferred into a document-term-matrix.19 
                                                          




In practice, we only observe the text documents. As illustrated in Figure 3, topics and topic proportions 
are not known and not visible. LDA provides a tool to infer the hidden - or latent - topic assignments for 
each word and topic proportions in each document by drawing comparisons between the documents. For 
this, we count all words in all documents and transfer them into a document-term-matrix (DTM) as 
indicated in the lower part of Figure 3. The DTM has the dimensions of the total number of documents 𝐷𝐷, 
and the total number of the occurring vocabulary 𝑉𝑉. Each element denotes how often a particular word 
occurs in a particular document. Each row of the DTM thus resembles the distribution of words in each 
document. We then ask: What is the best way to assign topic probabilities to words and documents given 
the observed distributions of words in each text? Formally, LDA estimates the following relationship 
between topics, proportions and assignments in the entirety of documents: 
𝑝𝑝(𝛽𝛽1:𝑘𝑘,𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷, 𝑧𝑧1:𝐷𝐷,𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷) = ∏ 𝑝𝑝(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1 ∏ 𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1 �∏ 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑,𝑛𝑛|𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑,𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑝(𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛|𝛽𝛽1:𝑘𝑘 , 𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑,𝑛𝑛)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1 �           (1) 
                            
In Equation (1), 𝛽𝛽1:𝐾𝐾 are the 𝐾𝐾 topics where each topic 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 is a distribution over the fixed vocabulary 
{1, … ,𝑉𝑉}. 𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷 are the topic proportions over all documents {1, … ,𝐷𝐷}. For a particular document 𝑑𝑑, 𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑 is 
the topic proportion, whereas 𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑,𝑘𝑘 denotes the proportion of topic 𝑘𝑘 in the document 𝑑𝑑. With respect to 
words, 𝑧𝑧1:𝐷𝐷 denotes the topic assignments to the words in all documents {1, … ,𝐷𝐷}. For a particular 
document, 𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑,𝑛𝑛 denotes the topic assignment for the 𝑛𝑛th word in document 𝑑𝑑. The only observables are 
the words in the documents, 𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷. Each document is a sequence of 𝑁𝑁 words: 𝑑𝑑 = (𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑,1,𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑,2, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑,𝑁𝑁). A 
word is the basic unit of discrete data, defined to be an item of the vocabulary stated above.20 
The challenge is that all distributions are unknown except for the words in each document. LDA is a way 
of inferring 𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷, 𝛽𝛽1:𝐾𝐾 and 𝑧𝑧1:𝐷𝐷 conditional on the known distribution of words in the documents, 𝑝𝑝(𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷): 
𝑝𝑝(𝛽𝛽1:𝑘𝑘,𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷, 𝑧𝑧1:𝐷𝐷| 𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷) =
𝑝𝑝(𝛽𝛽1:𝑘𝑘,𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷,𝑧𝑧1:𝐷𝐷,𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷)
𝑝𝑝( 𝑤𝑤1:𝐷𝐷)
              (2) 
 
The resulting distribution is the so-called posterior which reveals the hidden topic structure from the 
observed documents.21 
                                                          
20 Blei, Probabilistic Topic Models, p. 80. 




3.2 LDA applied to the data 
We apply LDA to a newly-compiled corpus of 432,172 articles published in The International New York 
Times (formerly The International Herald Tribune) and Financial Times between 2009 and 2015. 22 We 
choose this time period, because it comprises most and the most important events related to the Greek 
debt crisis starting in October 2009. Before 2009 the Greek debt crisis was not apparent as a pressing issue 
both in Greece, among financial analysists and in the global media. After 2015 we found considerably less 
news and events regarding the Greek debt crisis. Expanding our analysis to longer periods between January 
2007 and December 2016 or setting the starting time to October 2009 did not alter our results.  
For each document, we store the date of publication. We remove numbers, white spaces and empty lines. 
All letters are transformed to lower case. We stem words, namely by using the word parts to which affixes 
can be attached. Accordingly, we remove plurals and singular endings. Related expressions are counted as 
one term. For instance, the words “finance”, “finances” and “financial” are converted into the stemmed 
term “financ”. We also remove stop words (words without topical content) and rare words (words that 
occur fewer than 500 times in the entire corpus). The transformations result in a total number of 11,847 
distinct words as part of our vocabulary. We transfer the documents and vocabulary into a DTM with the 
dimensions 𝐷𝐷 = 432,172, and 𝑉𝑉 = 11,847. The transformation of the corpus reveals certain restrictions 
of our method. Topic models are not able to distinguish the structure, tone or sentiment of documents. 
That is, the method will assign the same topical content to the sentences “Merkel saves Greece” and 
“Greece saved Merkel” although the meaning may be fundamentally different. With respect to our aim in 
identifying news coverage about the Greek debt crisis, however, both sentences will likely point to 
information about the Greek debt crisis. 
We specify LDA by the total number of topics 𝐾𝐾 = 200. This number is in the range of the optimal number 
of topics according to four optimality measures that we have tested.23 We infer topics using Gibbs sampling 
                                                          
22 Articles were collected from the ProQuest and LexisNexis databases. Access via https://search.proquest.com/, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/. 
23 We tested according to four methods that have been proposed by (1) R. Arun/ V. Suresh/ C. E. Veni Madhavan/ 
M. N. Narasimha Murthy, On Finding the Natural Number of Topics with Latent Dirichlet Allocation: Some 
Observations, in Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining: 14th Pacific-Asia Conference, PAKDD 2010, 
Hyderabad, India, June 21-24, 2010. Proceedings. Part I, M. J. Zaki/ J. X. Yu/ B. Ravindran/ V. Pudi, Eds. Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer 2010, pp. 391–402; (2) J. Cao/ T. Xia/ J. Li, Y. Zhang/ S. Tang, A density-based method for 
adaptive LDA model selection, Neurocomputing, Vol. 72, No. 7, 2009, pp. 1775–1781; (3) R. Deveaud/ E. SanJuan-
Ibekwe/ P. Bellot, Accurate and effective latent concept modeling for ad hoc information retrieval, Doc. Numérique, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, 2014, pp. 61–84; (4) T. L. Griffiths/ M. Steyvers, Finding scientific topics, Proceedings of the National 
academy of Sciences, Vol. 101, No. suppl 1, 2004, pp. 5228–5235. 
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with 1,000 iterations. To apply Gibbs sampling we further need to set the starting values – or priors – for 
the topic distributions over documents 𝜃𝜃1:𝐷𝐷 and the distributions over terms 𝛽𝛽1:𝐾𝐾. We follow the literature 
and set 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 = 50/𝐾𝐾 and 𝜂𝜂 = 0.1.24  
The posterior results in two outputs. First, we receive a matrix 𝛽𝛽 with probabilities of each word in each 
topic 𝑘𝑘 = 1 … 200. This matrix is useful to relate the estimated topics to actual text content. We can order 
the words in each topic by probability and observe which words likely appear together in documents with 
a high proportion of a certain topic. Second, the matrix 𝜃𝜃 relates a probability of each topic to each 
document. 𝜃𝜃 specifies the topic proportions, which means the probability by which each topic occurs in 
each document. 
 
Table 1: Results topic model 
Topic 64 Topic 83 Topic 169  Topic 27 Topic 12 
           
garden econom greec  syria obama 
tree economi greek  syrian presid 
mountain polici bailout  assad administr 
forest fiscal imf  regim white 
anim govern countri  rebel hous 
dog growth fund  opposit barack 
plant countri european  govern american 
flower reform financ  forc bush 
bird deficit govern  war washington 
natur crisi minist  lebanon polici 
           
An excerpt from the matrix 𝛽𝛽. Ten terms with highest probabilities of topics 64, 83, 169, 12 estimated from 
articles in The International New York Times and Financial Times from January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 
2015. Method: LDA via Gibbs Sampling. 𝐾𝐾 = 200,𝛼𝛼 = 0.8, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 = 1000. 
 
                                                          
24 As proposed by TL Griffiths/ M Steyvers, Finding Scientific Topics, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol 101, 2004, pp. 5228-5235; See B. Grün/ K. Hornik, 
topicmodels: An R Package for fitting Topic Models, in: Journal of Statistical Software, Vol 40, No. 13, 2011, pp.1-30.  
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Table 1 represents an excerpt of the matrix β. The topics are lists of terms ordered by probability. In the 
table, we show the top ten most likely terms in five of the 200 estimated topics. The higher the term’s 
position is on the list, the higher is its probability to appear in the topic. The first column lists the ten most 
likely terms in “topic 64”. The terms stated in this column will likely occur in a document with a high share 
of the topic that the algorithm has denoted as “topic 64”. The top terms constituting this topic are 
“garden”, “tree”, “flower”, “plant”, “mountain”, etc. A high share of this topic in a document will likely be 
related to an article content related to nature or garden. The topic in the second column (“topic 83”) 
comprises the top terms “growth”, “economi”, “econom”, “polici” and “rate”. Documents with a high 
share of this topic will likely have content related to economic conditions. 
 We search the matrix β for topics that point to terms about the Greek debt crisis. Our finding is “topic 
169”. We show the top terms in the third column of Table 1. Among the most likely terms are word forms 
related to Greece, like “greec”, “greek” and “countri”, as well as financial terms like “imf”, “fund” and 
“financ”. Above that, we find crisis words like “bailout”. If we proceed further down the word list of this 
topic (see appendix), we find even more terms that point to “topic 169” being a specific Greek debt crisis 




Figure 3: Four exemplary articles with a high share of “topic 169” 
 
Beginnings of four exemplary articles with a high share of “topic 169”. Articles taken from the Financial 
Times and The International New York Times. Terms highlighted in gray have a high probability in “topic 
169”. As comparison, we also show terms with a high probability of “topic 83” highlighted in dark grey.  
 
To check whether “topic 169” points to news coverage about the Greek debt crisis, we next turn to the 
matrix θ. θ comprises the topic proportions in each document of the corpus. It assigns a probability of 
each topic to each document. The probabilities of all topics in a document sum up to one. Figure 4 shows 
the beginning of four exemplary articles with a high share of “topic 169”. Clearly, all articles seem to deal 
with Greece and the Greek debt crisis in particular. 
We check more articles with a high share of the topic and conclude that “topic 169” points to an article 
content dealing with the Greek debt crisis. In the next section, we further verify this finding. For the 
remainder of this article, we propose “topic 169” as our variable of interest regarding news coverage about 
the Greek debt crisis. We denote “topic 169” as the “Greek debt crisis topic” and treat it as a proxy for 




Figure 5: Greek debt crisis topic - daily average share 2009-2015 
 
Source: Daily average share of the Greek debt crisis topic (“topic 169”) in The International New York Times 
and Financial Times, January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015.  
 
We sum the proportions of the Greek debt crisis topic by date. Figure 5 plots the daily average share of 
the Greek debt crisis topic in the articles of The International New York Times and Financial Times over the 
period from January 1st 2009 to December 31st 2015. As is apparent, the topic has a higher share on some 
dates and time periods compared with other dates. In 2009, media coverage is low or possibly non-
existent. After the new Greek government announced an exorbitant deficit in October 2009 – a point in 
time that some sources define as the beginning of the crisis – the Greek debt crisis topic increases to high 
levels in the first half of 2010. We observe many days with a high share of the topic at the height of the 
crisis between 2010 and mid-2012. After low levels of the topic from mid-2013 to 2014, the topic spikes 
again between January and July 2015 on many occasions. In this period, the newly-elected SYRIZA 
government fueled fears of an intensification of the crisis again. The topic seems to spike higher in 2015 
than during earlier periods.  
In the next section, we relate the Greek debt crisis topic to actual events during the crisis. Accordingly, we 




4 News coverage and events in the Greek crisis 
 
Many critical events with relation to the Greek debt crisis remain in our memories; events that 
substantially and lastingly affected the Greek economy and the Greek reputation on financial markets. The 
course of events during the crisis was evidently covered in many news outlets and supposedly affected 
expectations on financial markets. 
We use events in two ways: By comparing events and news coverage, we first check whether our proxy 
for news coverage grasps the events that took place in the course of the Greek debt crisis. We then 
examine whether news coverage matters for the transmission of events to financial markets. Comparing 
dates with events and news coverage to dates without events but news coverage, we are potentially able 
to identify an information effect of the media (information about an event) and a narration effect 
(narratives about the Greek debt crisis apart from events). 
We collect a timeline of events with relation to the Greek debt crisis from the Bank of Greece publication 
the Chronicle of the Great Crisis.25 The publication contains yearly tables of events with the exact date and 
a detailed description for the period from 2009 to 2013. In order to fill possible gaps and expand the list 
of events into 2014 and 2015, we also consider other sources.26  
Our series comprises 205 dates that relate to events during the Greek debt crisis. We compare the event 
series to our proposed proxy for media coverage, namely the Greek debt crisis topic series. We find that 
the majority of events can be related to increased news coverage around the day of the event. By increased 
news coverage, we define the 15 percent days with the highest level of the Greek debt crisis topic. We 
chose 15 percent because it roughly constitutes a one standard deviation above the daily average mean 
share of the topic. We define an event as covered by the news if we find a date with increased news 
coverage on the five days before or after the event. As a robustness check, we also test thresholds of 10 
percent and 20 percent. For both thresholds as a measure for high media coverage, we still relate the 
                                                          
25 Y. Seferlis/ K. Lagaria, The Chronicle of the Great Crisis: The Bank of Greece 2008-2013: Public Interventions and 
Institutional Actions to Safeguard Financial Stability and Overcome the Crisis, Bank of Greece, 2014. 
26  We consider the timeline of events in the Greek debt crisis from Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
eurozone-greece-economy-timeline/timeline-greeces-economic-crisis-idUSTRE62230T20100303, 06.12.2017), 
Wikipedia (articles on the “Greek government-debt crisis”, the “European debt crisis”, the “Great recession and 
2000s European sovereign debt crisis timeline”, and “Anti-austerity movement in Greece”) and the German 
television news service Tagesschau (https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/griechenland640.html, 06.12.2017). 
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majority of events to high news coverage. Changing the threshold did not alter the significance levels of 
the main results in our empirical analysis in the next section. 
 
Figure 6: Events with a high daily share of the Greek debt crisis topic 
 
Events as provided by Bank of Greece (2015) and others. Daily average share of the Greek debt crisis topic 
(topic 169), January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. Grey vertical line: threshold of days with the highest 
average share. 
 
In Figure 6, we plot the news coverage and indicate the major events that we are able to relate to increased 
news coverage. The dark gray vertical line indicates the 15 percent threshold. We define 136 of the 205 
events as part of this group. We provide an overview of all events and the classification into sub-groups in 
the appendix. 
We check articles with the highest shares of the Greek debt crisis topic around each date. We find that 
many events during the crisis are indeed taken up by the global media. The Greek debt crisis topic has a 
high share in global newspapers around events like the Greek bailouts, negotiations about rescue packages 
with the so-called Troika and Mario Draghi's famous speech in July 2012. This finding underpins our 
assumption that the Greek debt crisis topic can act as a measure of news coverage. Global media take up 
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actual events about the Greek debt crisis and utilize vocabulary from the Greek debt crisis topic in those 
articles. These crucial events remain in the group of events covered by the media when varying our 
threshold of high media coverage. 
 
Figure 7: Events without a high share of the Greek debt crisis topic 
 
Events as provided by Bank of Greece (2015) and others. Daily average share of the Greek debt crisis topic 
(topic 169) January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. Grey vertical line: threshold of days with the highest 
average share. 
 
From the series of all events, we identify another group of events. Some events do not go along with a 
high share of the Greek debt crisis topic on the same day, the preceding or following days. Figure 7 
indicates the events around which news coverage (e.g. the Greece debt crisis topic) is below the 15 percent 
threshold of the series. Of the 205 events in our series, we assign 69 events to this group. Among the 
events in this group, we find reports of the Bank of Greece on the economic and financial outlook of 
Greece, political events like protests or debates in the Greek parliament. We also find downgrades of 
Greek government bonds by major rating agencies in this group. 
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The occurrence of events without news coverage in the global media points to the fact that such events 
were probably not sufficiently important to make it into news outlets like The International New York Times 
or Financial Times. Luhmann’s notion of a selection bias of the media provides a possible explanation. 
Some events were probably not important or informative enough to be covered, while other events were 
possibly not covered due to the severity of other events and headlines on those dates. By selecting the 
covered and not covered events, the media influences the set of information available to a global public. 
Another reason could be that the events were covered but without use of the Greek debt crisis topic. In 
this case, our measure of news coverage would fail to grasp important information covered in global news 
about the Greek debt crisis. By comparing the impact of covered and non-covered events in the global 
media on financial markets, we aim to find an information effect of news. Only events covered should 
matter for financial markets expectations about Greece. 
 
Figure 8: High daily share of the Greek debt crisis topic without events 
 
Daily average share of the Greek debt crisis topic (topic 169) January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
Dates indicated are with a high share of the Greek debt crisis topic but without events according to the 




We find a third group of dates that potentially holds information for the analysis of media coverage and 
financial expectations, namely dates with increased media coverage but without events. In Figure 8, we 
indicate dates that are among the 15 percent days with the highest news coverage according to the Greek 
debt crisis topic series but are without an event on the five days before or after that date according to our 
event series. These days could potentially point to an effect of articles and reports about the Greek debt 
crisis on financial markets without a “distorting” effect of actual events. News coverage on such dates 
presumably does not contain new information with respect to the crisis, since no events occur. Therefore, 
these dates may constitute media reports that affect financial markets via stories and narratives.  We may 




5 Empirical study - the role of media coverage on financial 
markets 
 
In order to examine the role of events and media coverage in the Greek debt crisis on financial markets, 
we collect daily data on the yield to maturity for ten-year Greek government bonds over the period from 
January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. We chose the Greek bond yield because it likely reflects actions 
taken by financial actors with respect to the Greek debt crisis and may thus reflect expectations about the 
Greek debt crisis on financial markets. For our analysis, we take the logarithm of the series and then 
transform the bond yield (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) into first differences. Accordingly, we define: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡)− 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1)    (3) 
 
We thereby relate our measures of events and media coverage to daily changes of the bond yield and 
ensure stationarity of the series. We repeat the following analysis using levels of the Greek interest rate 
(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) instead of changes. The main results are robust to this variation and we provide the results in the 
appendix. 
We aim to observe the extent to which global news coverage and the classified events affect changes in 
the Greek bond yield as a proxy for financial actors' expectations. We start with the Greece debt crisis 
topic as our proxy for media coverage and then turn to the events. We also check whether classifying 
events into favorable and unfavorable news supports our results. We then test the effect of news coverage 
without events. 
 
5.1 News series 
To test whether media coverage has an effect on financial markets, we regress changes in the Greek bond 
yield (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ) on the Greek debt crisis topic (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡). We add lags of both the topic series (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1) and the bond yield 
series (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) in the following manner: 




We depict our finding in Table 2. News coverage (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) exercises a significant effect on changes in the Greek 
bond yield on the same day and no effect on the next day. The effect is positive but small on the same day 
and negative on the next day. This is the case although the lagged changes in the bond yield itself (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) 
explain parts of the yield changes in 𝐼𝐼. The perception about Greece or the Greek debt crisis via the news 
coverage may thus play a role in financial markets. 
 
Table 2: Regression results news coverage 
 
Results of regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on the daily average share of the Greek debt crisis 
topic and lags of both series (see Equation (4)). Time period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
              
5.2 Event series 
Next, we turn to events. We ask whether there is an effect on the Greek bonds yield on the days and the 
following days after dates in the four series: all events in our series, events with news coverage, events 
without news coverage and news coverage without events. 
 
In order to answer this question, we regress the changes in the Greek bond yield (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) on dummy series (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) 
for each event class and five lags. We add one lag of the bond yield series: 




Dependent (Greek Debt crisis topic)
Variable: Δ Bond yield (1)
X  0.01 *
L(X, 1) -0.005






We depict our findings in Table 3. Starting with all events in our series, column (1) shows the effect of days 
with any events concerning the Greek debt crisis and the five following days. We find a weakly significant 
positive effect on the day of the event and a weakly significant negative effect one day after the event. 
The other parameters of the events’ lags are insignificant. 
 
Table 3: Regression results events 
 
Results of regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on event dummy series and lags of both series (see 
Equation (5)). Time period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
We next look at subsets of all events. Column (2) depicts the effect of dates with events that go along with 
coverage in the global media. Such dates have a significant negative effect on the two days after the event 
and a positive significant effect three days after the event. Regarding events without news coverage, 
column (3) reveals that such events appear to have no effect at all on the same day or the five days 
following. All lags are insignificant. 
What about a potential narrative effect of news coverage on days without an event? Column (4) shows no 
effect of days without events but with media coverage about the Greek crisis. Seemingly, news coverage 
alone has no effect if it is not accompanied by newsworthy events. 
Dependent 
Variable: Δ Bondyield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.003 * 0.005 -0.001 0.003
L(D, 1)  -0.01 *  -0.01 ** -0.003 0.0004
L(D, 2) -0.005  -0.01 ** 0.001 0.003
L(D, 3) 0.01  0.01 ** 0.001 -0.001
L(D, 4) -0.001 0 -0.003 0.003
L(D, 5) 0.002 0.003 0.0003 0.001
L(Y, 1)  0.04 *  0.04 *  0.04 *  0.04 *
Constant 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817
R2 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.002
Independent Variable:
All Events  Events, No Events, 
events  and Media  No Media but Media
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In sum, the total series of events appears to have a small effect. While events covered in the news have a 
stronger effect, events not covered show no effect. Therefore, media coverage seems to matter. However, 
it matters predominantly in combination with an event, whereas high news coverage alone has no effect. 
This finding points to the existence of an information effect of media, while there is no evidence of a direct 
narration effect, which we would expect on days without events. Importantly, we cannot argue that there 
is no narration effect, since news coverage on days with events could also contribute to the narrative about 
the crisis. To disentangle both effects should be subject of a careful qualitative examination.  
 
5.3 Favorable and unfavorable Events 
From our first set of regressions, news coverage seems to matter for the transmission of events on financial 
markets. One problem with the significant parameters of the events covered in the media is that they 
point in differing directions. Therefore, the covered events significantly increase and decrease the Greek 
bond yield. One possible reason for positive and negative coefficients may be that there are favorable and 
not so favorable news concerning Greece in our set of events. 
Therefore, we split our sample into series of positive and negative events. We define positive events as 
any events that we regard as “good news” for financial investors in Greece. We select solutions to 
negotiations, agreements and passing of legislations on rescue and austerity measures as part of the 
positive group. By contrast, we define events as negative if they hamper the future outlook of gains or at 
least not losses on financial assets in Greece. Other “bad news” for financial investors in Greece are those 
that raise uncertainty about the future outlook of the Greek economy, bailouts involving private investors 
and political turmoil. We also include news about higher-than-expected deficits in this group. By this 
classification, of the 205 events in total, we define 82 events as positive and 67 events as negative. We 




Table 4: Regression results positive and negative events (as compared to all events) 
 
Results from regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on dummy series of favorable and unfavorable 
events and lags of both series (see Equation (5)). Time period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
  
We run Equation (5) again using the two sub-groups, whereby Table 4 depicts the results. Column (1) 
shows the baseline case of all – positive and negative – events taken from the previous section. As before, 
we find no clear effect. By splitting the sample, we observe a more intuitive result. Column (2) shows the 
effect of positive events. We find a significant negative effect on Greek bond yields on the two days 
following and no effect on the same day. A significant negative parameter implies a falling bond yield and 
thus more favorable credit conditions for Greece. This is intuitively correct and explains the significant 
lagged effect of events on the bond yield. Column (3) depicts the effect of days with negative events. We 
observe significant positive parameters on the day of such events and two days later. As we would expect, 
negative events increase the bond yield and worsen Greek credit conditions on the following days. 
By splitting our event series into positive and negative events, we obtain reasonable and significant effects 
of the two sub-groups on changes of Greek bond yields. What about the sub-groups of events with and 
without coverage? We next multiply each event series by our series of positive and negative events and 
employ Equation (5) again on the four sub-samples. 
 
Dependent 
Variable: Δ Bondyield (1) (2) (3)
D 0.003 -0.01  0.01 **
L(D, 1)  -0.01 *  -0.02 *** 0.01
L(D, 2) -0.005  -0.01 ***  0.01 *
L(D, 3) 0.01  0.01 * -0.003
L(D, 4) -0.001 0.004 0.001
L(D, 5) 0.002 0.005 -0.0004
L(Y, 1)  0.04 * 0.04  0.04 *
Constant 0.0005 0.001 -0.001
Observations 1817 1817 1817
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01
Independent Variable:




Table 5: Regression results positive and negative events with or without news coverage 
 
Results from regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on sub-series of favorable and unfavorable events 
and lags of both series (see Equation (5)). Time period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for the positive and negative sub-groups. Columns (1) and (2) depict the results 
for events with news coverage, while columns (3) and (4) depict the results for events without news 
coverage. According to column (1), the Greek bond yields decline in the two days following a positive event 
with news coverage (rows 2-3). By contrast, negative events with news coverage (column (2)) significantly 
increase the bond yield on the day of the event. Turning to events without coverage, Column (3) shows 
the effect of positive events without news coverage. We find no significant effect for this series. The same 
is true for negative effects without media coverage (Column (4)). Seemingly, events that do not make it 
into the editorial boards in London or New York likewise do not make it all the way to Wall Street. Indeed, 
this appears to be true for both positive and negative events. By contrast, positive and negative events 
covered in the media significantly transfer into the expected reactions on financial markets. 
 
5.4 News coverage without events 
The media may matter for the translation of events into expectations on financial markets, although thus 
far we find no evidence for a narration effect of news stories on days without events (as indicated in Table 
3, column (4)). This is contrary to our second hypothesis that reports about Greece and the Greek debt 
Dependent 
Variable: Δ Bondyield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D -0.002  0.02 ** -0.01 0.01
L(D, 1)  -0.02 *** 0.01 -0.01 -0.0001
L(D, 2)  -0.02 *** 0.01 0.002 0.01
L(D, 3)  0.01 ** -0.004 0.001 -0.003
L(D, 4) 0.01 0.003 -0.001 -0.002
L(D, 5) 0.01 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
L(Y, 1) 0.04  0.04 *  0.04 *  0.04 *
Constant 0.001 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0001
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817
R2 0.02 0.01 0.004 0.003
Positive events Negative events 
+ Media + Media No Media No Media
Independent Variable:
Positive events Negative events 
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crisis may affect financial expectations even without an event. Therefore, we take a closer look at the 
series of dates with news coverage but without events. 
Our guess is that high levels of media coverage about the Greek debt crisis may also point in two directions. 
Some reports may have a favorable outlook on Greece, while other reports have an unfavorable outlook 
on Greece. To codify the series, we read the news articles on the days with increased media coverage but 
without events. On each date, we find articles concerning the Greek debt crisis. We classify the dates into 
three groups: days with predominantly positive news coverage regarding the Greek debt crisis, days with 
a negative outlook and the remaining dates without a clear positive or negative outlook. 
 
Table 6: Regression results positive/negative media coverage on dates with no events but with news 
coverage. 
   
Results of regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on series of dates with high news coverage and 
favorable or unfavorable news with respect to Greece. We add lags of both series (see Equation 5)). Time 
period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
We employ Equation (5) again on each sub-group of days without events, whereby Table 6 depicts the 
results. Column (1) shows the effect of all dates without events on changes of the Greek bond yield. We 
find no effect. Columns (2) and (3) show the effect divided by the sub-groups of positive and negative 
events, respectively. Again, we find no effect. The same is true for dates without a clear positive or negative 
Dependent 
Variable: Δ Bond yield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.01
L(D, 1) 0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
L(D, 2) 0.003 -0.02 0.004 0.001
L(D, 3) -0.001 0.01 0.005 -0.01
L(D, 4) 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.01
L(D, 5) 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.005
L(Y, 1)  0.04 *  0.04 *  0.04 *  0.04 *
Constant 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817
R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
Independent Variable:
No Events No Events No Events No Events
Media Positive Media, Negative Media, Neutral Media,
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outlook (column (4)). In sum, financial markets do not seem to react to media coverage without events, 
even when focusing on positive or negative reports separately. Accordingly, we find no evidence of a 
“narration effect”. 






We have studied the effect of events and their coverage in the news about the Greek debt crisis in global 
media on the expectations of financial actors. In particular, we have tested whether news coverage has an 
effect on changes of the Greek bond yield depending on whether events were covered in the news. We 
proposed topic modeling as a novel way to classify news coverage from global newspapers and to 
construct a quantitative measure of news coverage about the Greek debt crisis. 
Our hypothesis was that there is both an information and a narration effect of global media. Events are 
transmitted to financial markets via the media. Events covered in the media should affect financial 
markets, while events not covered should have no effect. Beyond events, narration should also matter for 
financial markets, in the sense that dates with news coverage but without an event have an effect. 
Our finding is that events concerning the Greek debt crisis affect financial markets via global news 
coverage. Events that go along with media coverage affect Greek bond yields on the same day or the days 
following. This is not the case for events that are not covered. The effect is in the expected direction when 
we classify positive and negative events. Positive events covered in the news reduce the Greek bond yield 
while negative events increase the Greek bond yield. For positive or negative events not covered in global 
news, we find no effect. We conclude that events that appear in the global media also affect financial 
markets. This finding supports the hypothesis that global media coverage matters in the translation of 
events on financial markets. 
We further tested whether days with high news coverage without events on the same date affected 
financial markets. We find no evidence that media coverage matters on dates without events. Apparently, 
solely media reports do not form expectations on financial markets, at least not immediately. This finding 
is contrary to our second hypothesis that narration matters as much as information.   
Our analysis supports Jens Beckert’s proposition that fictional expectations are spread via the global mass 
media to financial markets in the course of the Greek crisis. To be precise, the information function of the 
media provides occasions for financial markets’ participants to update their expectations when events are 
covered by the media and in anticipation of other actors receiving the same signals via the media. We 
propose topic models to identify media coverage as a first step to make the transmission of fictional 
expectations via the media visible. This finding is also in line with Luhmann’s supposition that the selection 
bias of the media influences function systems’ and individuals’ expectations. However, while the 
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transmission of events and thus new information via the media seems to matter, we cannot verify a 
distinct effect of narratives and stories on financial markets. More work is necessary to investigate the 
transmission mechanism of the media in further detail. In the future, we plan to analyze more specific 
groups of events and from a more qualitative perspective and relate the results to the quantitative 
approach used here. By this we expect to further clarify in how far we can disentangle information and 
narration within articles concerning events. We also intend to focus in more detail on the temporal 
dimension of changing media coverage in the course of the crisis. Media coverage may create certain 
narratives that only become relevant when new and important information occurs. This study provides a 













Table A.1: Top 20 words in five exemplified topics ranked by probability in each topic 
  Topic 64 Topic 169 Topic 83 Topic 27 Topic 12 
1 garden greec econom syria obama 
  1.87% 7.17% 6.46% 6.11% 14.84% 
2 tree greek economi syrian presid 
  1.65% 5.59% 5.79% 4.05% 10.39% 
3 mountain bailout polici assad administr 
  1.49% 2.50% 3.43% 1.93% 6.44% 
4 forest imf fiscal regim white 
  1.09% 2.38% 2.96% 1.84% 2.78% 
5 anim countri govern rebel hous 
  1.07% 2.23% 2.59% 1.59% 2.75% 
6 dog fund growth opposit barack 
  1.02% 2.10% 2.39% 1.48% 2.59% 
7 plant european countri govern american 
  1.02% 2.04% 2.23% 1.36% 2.58% 
8 flower financ reform forc bush 
  0.98% 1.99% 2.07% 1.26% 2.35% 
9 bird govern deficit war washington 
  0.93% 1.90% 2.03% 1.21% 2.10% 
10 natur minist crisi lebanon polici 
  0.88% 1.85% 1.83% 1.11% 1.83% 
11 land intern economist conflict america 
  0.78% 1.63% 1.58% 1.10% 1.20% 
12 wild athen debt arm secretari 
  0.72% 1.51% 1.47% 1.03% 1.16% 
13 villag debt domest support georg 
  0.72% 1.41% 1.40% 1.00% 1.07% 
14 park eurozon stimulus weapon advis 
  0.60% 1.39% 1.34% 1.00% 1.05% 
15 river euro gdp intern nation 
  0.58% 1.38% 1.19% 0.94% 0.98% 
16 landscap offici monetari damascus clinton 
  0.56% 1.15% 1.05% 0.90% 0.97% 
17 hill auster gross group speech 
  0.53% 1.00% 1.05% 0.85% 0.90% 
18 winter monetari financ secur offici 
  0.52% 0.93% 1.01% 0.79% 0.84% 
19 place rescu product bashar congress 
  0.50% 0.91% 0.99% 0.78% 0.76% 
20 walk creditor financi fight polit 
  0.50% 0.84% 0.93% 0.76% 0.70% 
Top 20 words with the highest probability for five exemplified topics. We rank each word in each topic by 
probability. We indicate the probability of each word in the designated topic by the probability in italics 




A.2 Events during the Greek debt crisis 2009-2015 
 
Table A.2: Events during the Greek debt crisis 2009-2015. 
Date Event Coverage27 Meaning28 
16.02.2009 Bank of Greece Monetary Policy Report 2008-2009: The 
widening yield spread will entail a higher future burden. 
0 -1 
15.04.2009 Bank of Greece Annual Report for 2008: Greece must break 
with the growth model of the past that eventually led to lasting 
deficits and debts. 
0 -1 
28.07.2009 Bank of Greece Bulletin of Conjunctural Indicators: Central 
government deficit in the first half of the year exceeds 
expectations. 
0 -1 
04.10.2009 Parliamentary elections are held: PASOK comes out as the 
leading party and forms a majority government. 0 1 
09.10.2009 The Governor of the Bank of Greece meets with the new 
Finance Minister George Papakonstantinou. They report that 
the deficit for the first nine months is in the order of 10% and 
looks set to rise to, if not exceed, 12% by the end of the year . 
0 -1 
19.10.2009 The European Commission opens an investigation into the 
reliability of Greek data. 0 -1 
22.10.2009 The Greek authorities announce that the 2009 budget deficit is 
more than double its projection; Rating Fitch: Downgrade 0 -1 
08.12.2009 Rating Fitch: Downgrade. 0 -1 
16.12.2009 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade. 0 -1 
22.12.2009 Rating Moody’s:  Downgrade. 0 -1 
09.02.2010 First austerity package passed in Greek parliament 1 1 
11.02.2010 The EU guarantees Greece political support, but no bail-out 
package. 1 -1 
03.03.2010 Second austerity package passed 1 1 
22.03.2010 Eurostat announces that the 2009 deficit in Greece is revised 
to 13.6% of GDP. 1 -1 
25.03.2010 Euro area Member States agree to establish a support 
mechanism for Greece, if the country is shut out of markets. 1 0 
09.04.2010 Rating Fitch: Downgrade. 1 -1 
22.04.2010 Rating Moody’s: Downgrade. 1 -1 
23.04.2010 Prime Minister G. Papandreou announces that Greece has 
officially requested the activation of the support mechanism. 1 0 
27.04.2010 Rating S&P: Downgrade  1 -1 
02.05.2010 Greek negotiations with the EU and the IMF lead to an 
agreement on a three-year aid package worth €110 billion. 1 1 
03.05.2010 The ECB announces that it will accept Greek government bonds 
as collateral for its credit operations, regardless of their rating. 1 1 
                                                          
27 Codifying of the event whether the media coverage on this day is above or below the 15 per cent threshold: 
above=1, below=0. 
28 Codifying of the event for the Greek government: positive=1, neutral=0, negative=-1. 
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05.05.2010 Greece wide riots, strikes and demonstrations 1 -1 
06.05.2010 Third austerity package passed 1 1 
10.05.2010 The ECB decides to conduct interventions in the euro area 
public and private debt securities. EU and IMF decide a €750 
billion package to stabilize the Euro. 
1 1 
12.05.2010 Greece receives the €5.5 billion by the IMF. Greek trade unions 
announce general strike. 1 1 
18.05.2010 Greece receives the first €14.5 billion tranche by the EU. 1 1 
14.06.2010 Rating Fitch: Downgrade 0 -1 
05.08.2010 The first review of the Economic Adjustment Program is 
completed by the European Commission/ECB/IMF (hereinafter 
the “Troika”). The second instalment amounts to €9 billion. 
0 1 
19.08.2010 The European Commission approves the second instalment of 
the loan to Greece. 0 1 
10.09.2010 The IMF also approves its €2.57 billion-worth contribution to 
the second instalment of the financial assistance to Greece. 0 1 
18.10.2010 At a meeting between President Sarkozy and Chancellor 
Merkel, the participation of private creditors in the bailout of 
distressed euro area countries is suggested for the first time. 
0 -1 
11.11.2010 Greece fails to hit its austerity targets. 0 -1 
15.11.2010 Eurostat announces that the Greek budget deficit in 2009 was 
higher than assumed. 1 -1 
18.11.2010 A more tightening budget proposal is published. 1 0 
21.11.2010 Ireland officially requests financial assistance from the EU and 
the euro area.  1 0 
23.11.2010 The Troika approves the disbursement of the third instalment 
(€9 billion) to Greece. 1 1 
15.12.2010 New Austerity law, lead to protests and riots in Greece. 0 -1 
16.12.2010 EU Summit. EU Heads of State or Government endorse the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 0 1 
14.01.2011 Rating Fitch: Downgrade 0 -1 
24.02.2011 Completion of the third review of the financial assistance 
program by the Troika. Next step the agreement on the fourth 
instalment amounting to €15 billion. 
1 1 
07.03.2011 Rating Moody’s: Downgrade. 0 -1 
29.03.2011 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade. 0 -1 
06.04.2011 Portugal is the third euro area country to seek financial aid. 1 0 
14.04.2011 In Greece unemployment rises to all-time high. 1 -1 
15.04.2011 Prime minister Papandreou announces new austerity package. 1 1 
26.04.2011 Greece concedes a higher budget deficit in 2010 than assumed. 0 -1 
09.05.2011 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade. 1 -1 
20.05.2011 Rating Fitch: Downgrade. 1 -1 
27.05.2011 No agreement between the Greek parties about new austerity 
measures, although the austerity measures are the 
preconditions for new financial aid by the EU and IMF. Without 




31.05.2011 The negotiations about a further tranche by the EU are 
completed. Athens will privatize state properties and lower the 
sales tax. 
1 0 
01.06.2011 Rating Moody’s: Downgrade. 1 -1 
03.06.2011 EU, IMF, and ECB give Greece a good reference. The next €12 
billion tranche can be paid out. 1 1 
06.06.2011 Greece sells 10 per cent share of telecommunication company 
OTE to Deutsche Telekom for 400 million Euros. 1 1 
08.06.2011 German minister of finance Wolfgang Schäuble demands a 
second financial aid package and debt restructuring for Greece.  1 0 
10.06.2011 The German parliament approves the rescue package for 
Greece, but under specific conditions. 1 0 
13.06.2011 Rating Standard & Poor's: Downgrade. 1 -1 
17.06.2011 Portugal’s request for financial aid is approved by the 
European Council. 1 1 
20.06.2011 The Eurogroup agrees to define by early July a new financial 
support package, calling for voluntary private sector 
involvement. 
1 0 
21.06.2011 Prime minister Papandreou wins no-confidence vote. 1 1 
29.06.2011 Fourth austerity package is passed by Greek parliament. Large 
two-day demonstrations in front of parliament.  1 1 
02.07.2011 The Eurogroup approves the disbursement of the fifth 
instalment. 1 1 
13.07.2011 Rating Fitch : Downgrade. 1 -1 
15.07.2011 Publication of results of the EU-wide bank stress testing.  1 0 
21.07.2011 The heads of Government of the euro member states agree to 
support a new program for Greece, amounting to €109 billion, 
with the voluntary contribution of the private sector. 
1 0 
25.07.2011 Rating Moody’s: Downgrade. 1 -1 
27.07.2011 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade. 1 -1 
19.08.2011 The Bank of Greece appoints a liquidator at Proton Bank. 0 0 
29.08.2011 Alpha Bank and Eurobank announce plans to merge.  1 0 
02.09.2011 The negotiations between the Greek government and the 
Troika reach a deadlock, with the Troika representatives 
leaving Athens. 
1 -1 
11.09.2011 New package of measures adopted by the Greek government, 
including the introduction of a special property tax. 1 1 
12.09.2011 The German minister for economic affairs provokes discussions 
by considering a Greek bankruptcy. 1 -1 
19.09.2011 IMF put pressure on Greece for more reforms. Athens signals 
its willingness to stricter austerity measures in the future. 1 0 
21.09.2011 Greece announces officially a further austerity package. 1 0 
11.10.2011 Troika pays out the next tranche for Greece. 1 0 
20.10.2011 Troika recommends to pay-out the next tranche for Greece. 
The Greek parliament approves a fifth austerity package. 1 1 
21.10.2011 The disbursement of the sixth tranche is endorsed by the euro 
area finance ministers. A Troika report states that Greece need 




26.10.2011 The euro area summit approves a new loan to Greece, 
amounting to €130 billion, as well as a haircut in Greek debt 
with private sector involvement (PSI). 
1 -1 
31.10.2011 Greek Prime Minister Papandreou announces plan for a 
referendum on the new aid agreement and raises discussions 
for a vote of confidence in the government. Following his 
meeting with German Chancellor Merkel and French President 
Sarkozy in Cannes on 2 November, he calls off the referendum. 
1 -1 
01.11.2011 Greece’s plan for a referendum evokes price drops on stock 
markets and criticism in Greece. Papandreou’s majority in 
parliament shrinks.  
1 -1 
03.11.2011 Euro members stop financial aid for Greece and put 
Papandreou under pressure. In the evening Papandreou 
announces to give up the referendum. 
1 1 
05.11.2011 Prime minister Papandreou wins no-confidence vote, but 
signalizes to pave the way for an interim government. 1 -1 
06.11.2011 Papandreou signals to resign. Talks on forming a new 
government.  1 -1 
11.11.2011 An interim coalition government is formed under Lucas 
Papademos. 1 1 
16.11.2011 The Greek parliament elects Papademos as prime minister. 1 1 
17.11.2011 A report by the EU task force says, that the Greek government 
waits for €60 billion outstanding taxes.  1 1 
18.11.2011 The new Greek government plans to reduce the budget deficit 
down to 5.4 per cent. 1 1 
23.11.2011 Samaras supports austerity measures after his initial refusal. 1 1 
28.11.2011 Greece receives next €8 billion tranche. 1 1 
01.12.2011 Large protests against the austerity policies.  1 -1 
06.12.2011 Greek parliament votes for radical cuts. 0 0 
08.12.1011 ECB announces to support European banks for the next years. 0 1 
02.02.2012 Establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 1 1 
12.02.2012 The Greek Parliament passes a new loan agreement (sixth 
austerity package) amid violent protests and riots. 1 1 
21.02.2012 The Eurogroup endorses a second bailout package for Greece, 
worth over €130 billion. 1 1 
22.02.2012 Rating: Fitch: Downgrade. Greek parliament expects a budget 
deficit by 6.7 percent in 2012.  1 -1 
23.02.2012 The Greek Parliament and Eurozone governments approve the 
debt restructuring plan under the PSI. 1 -1 
24.02.2012 Greek Government blocks bank accounts in foreign countries 
to fight tax evasion. 1 0 
27.02.2012 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade(default-grade) 1 -1 
01.03.2012 Decision of the international swaps and derivatives association 
says that credit default swaps for Greece become invalid in the 
case of debt waver of private creditors. Euro group paves the 
way for haircut and financial aid. 
1 0 
03.03.2012 Rating Moody’s: Downgrade (default grade) 1 0 
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09.03.2012 The restructuring of the Greek sovereign debt under the PSI is 
successfully completed. 1 1 
14.03.2012 Euro area countries approve the second economic adjustment 
program. The first tranche amounts to €39.4 billion. 1 1 
20.03.2012 The Greek parliament votes for second rescue package. 1 1 
04.04.2012 Violent protests against the austerity measures 0 -1 
02.05.2012 Rating: Standard and Poor’s: Upgrade 0 1 
06.05.2012 Legislative election. New Democracy (ND) comes first followed 
by SYRIZA.  1 0 
15.05.2012 Last talks about forming a government fail, which leads to new 
elections in June 2012. 1 -1 
16.05.2012 Panagiotis Pikramenos becomes head of an interim 
government until the new elections. 1 0 
17.05.2012 Rating Fitch: Downgrade 1 -1 
08.06.2012 Greece announces a drop in GDP by 6.5 per cent. 1 0 
17.06.2012 New legislative election. ND comes first followed by SYRIZA. 1 1 
20.06.2012 A coalition government is formed by ND, PASOK and DIMAR 
under Antonios Samaras. 1 1 
21.06.2012 Greek government requests for more time to implement 
austerity measures. 1 0 
25.06.2012 Cyprus applies for financial assistance under the EU Support 
Mechanism. Spain requests financial assistance from euro area 
Member States for the recapitalization of its banking sector. 
1 0 
29.06.2012 Euro area summit decision on the establishment of a Single 
Supervisory Mechanism for banks, with a view to creating a 
banking union in the euro area. 
1 0 
01.07.2012 The new Greek government asks to renegotiate the conditions 
of the rescue package. 1 0 
09.07.2012 Prime minister Samaras wins a no-confidence vote in 
parliament. 1 1 
20.07.2012 The ECB stops accepting Greek government bonds as 
collaterals for repo transactions. 1 0 
22.07.2012 German minister for economic affairs casts doubts on Greece 
to remain in the euro zone. The IMF considers a payment stop 
as media report. 
1 -1 
26.07.2012 President Draghi states that the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro. 1 1 
05.08.2012 The Troika is satisfied with the austerity policy. 0 1 
07.08.2012 Head of the euro group Jean-Claude Juncker thinks that it 
would be controllable if Greece leave the euro. 0 0 
14.08.2012 Greece gets fresh money on the money market and can 
therefore serve the ECB repayments. 0 1 
06.09.2012 The ECB decides on the modalities for undertaking Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for the 
purchase of short-term sovereign bonds in the euro area. 
0 1 
18.09.2012 The Greek minister of finance Stournaras states, that the 
government cannot hit the deficit target, because the 




25.09.2012 Greece announces a budget deficit of €13.5 billion and further 
financial needs of €15 billion, if the government gets two more 
years to implement their reforms.  
0 0 
26.09.2012 General strike interrupts especially the transportation sector. 0 -1 
09.10.2012 The IMF does not believe in the schedule of Greek financial 
recovery. The euro ministers of finance urge Greece to 
implement reforms. 
1 -1 
11.10.2012 IMF chief Lagarde proposes more time for Greece to cope with 
the crisis. 1 0 
18.10.2012 General strike hits Greece. 0 -1 
24.10.2012 The Greek minister of finance announces delays for 
implementation of cuts demanded by creditors, the EU 
commission, ECB and Euro member states. 
0 -1 
06.11.2012 Another general strike hits Greece. 1 -1 
07.11.2012 Seventh austerity package is adopted by Greek parliament. 1 1 
12.11.2012 The Greek parliament votes for the budget of the next year. 
Troika sees progress, but also risks remain.  1 1 
13.11.2012 The Eurogroup grants Greece more time to balance its budget, 
but they reach no agreement about the schedule of repayment 
and the financing over the next years. 
1 0 
21.11.2012 Negotiations between ministers of finance of the euro zone 
and IMF about the next tranche fail and postpone to the next 
week. 
 1 -1 
26.11.2012 The ministers of finance of the euro zone and IMF agree upon 
a further rescue package for Greece. 1 1 
27.11.2012 The Eurogroup decides to extend the fiscal adjustment 
program for Greece by two years, to improve lending terms 
and conditions and to support a debt buyback operation. 
1 1 
08.12.2012 Greece reports successful repurchase of bonds to reduce the 
debt by €20 billion. 0 1 
10.12.2012 Greece extends the deadline repurchase of bonds. 0 -1 
12.12.2012 The Greek program to repurchase yields €31.9 billion offers by 
creditors. 0 1 
13.12.2012 Eurogroup decision on the disbursement of the next 
instalment exceeding €49 billion. 0 1 
14.12.2012 Agreement of the European Council on the establishment of a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism for banks. 0 1 
18.12.2012 Market sentiment on Greece starts to gradually improve. 
Rating Standard and Poor’s: Upgrade. 0 1 
01.01.2013 Last-minute agreement reached by US legislative bodies to 
avert the fiscal cliff. 0 0 
12.01.2013 Greek parliament votes for higher taxes. 1 1 
21.01.2013 The economic adjustment program for Greece is on a positive 
track, according to the Eurogroup. An amount of €7.2 billion to 
cover bank recapitalization and resolution costs is to be paid 
out. 
0 1 
04.02.2013 Greece announces a budget deficit of 6.6 percent in 2012, but 
for the first time it has a primary budget surplus. 0 0 
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15.03.2013 Cyprus is hit by the crisis. The Eurogroup decides to provide 
financial assistance of €10 billion to Cyprus. 1 0 
19.03.2013 The Cypriot parliament rejects bailout conditions.  1 0 
25.03.2013 The Eurogroup reaches a new agreement with Cyprus, which 
includes an agreement between Cyprus and Greece on the 
transfer of Greek branches of the Cypriot banks, with a view to 
protecting the stability of both the Greek and the Cypriot 
banking systems. 
1 1 
08.04.2013 The merger of the National Bank of Greece and Eurobank has 
failed. 1 0 
15.04.2013 An agreement is reached following the conclusion of the third 
review of the Greek economic program by the Troika. The 
disbursement of a loan tranche of €2.8 billion is announced. 
0 1 
28.04.2013 Greek parliament approves a new austerity bill.  0 1 
03.05.2013 Positive assessment of the Greek program by the IMF. 0 1 
13.05.2013 Eurogroup agreement on the disbursement of two sub-
tranches, amounting to €7.5 billion. 0 1 
14.05.2013 Rating Fitch: Upgrade 0 1 
17.05.2013 The EFSF disburses €4,2 billion to Greece. 0 1 
11.06.2013 The Greek government shuts down the public broadcaster ERT. 0 -1 
17.06.2013 Greek supreme court mandates that the ERT must continue. 0 0 
21.06.2013 DIMAR leaves coalition with ND and PASOK. 0 0 
25.06.2013 The new government is sworn in, consisting only of ND and 
PASOK members, after DIMAR has left the coalition. 0 0 
08.07.2013 The Eurogroup approves the disbursement of €6.8 billion in 
tranches under the European Support Mechanism. 0 1 
16.07.2013 Greece-wide General strike (for the fourth time this year). 0 0 
17.07.2013 Greece government votes for new austerity bill. 0 1 
18.07.2013 The German minister of finance visits Athens suggesting to 
install a growth and development bank.  0 1 
24.09.2013 Strikes and protests against austerity measures. 0 0 
10.11.2013 A motion of no-confidence filed by opposition party SYRIZA is 
rejected in the Greek Parliament 0 0 
29.11.2013 Rating Moody’s: Upgrade. 0 1 
8.12.2013 The Greek Parliament passes the State Budget. 1 1 
30.03.2014 The Greek parliament passes a new austerity bill necessary for 
Greece to receive its next bailout payment. 0 1 
01.04.2014 Greece receives the next tranche. 0 1 
10.04.2014 Greece returns to financial markets  0 1 
23.05.2014 Rating Fitch: Upgrade 0 1 
09.05.2014 The Greek Parliament approves the Medium-term Fiscal 
Strategy plan 2015-2018 0 1 
09.06.2014 The cabinet is reshuffled. New finance minister. 0 0 
08.12.2014 In a first attempt, Greek parliament fails to elect a new 
president 1 -1 
29.12.2014 The election of a new president is failed and leads to new 
elections. 1 0 
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25.01.2015 SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras win the election and built a coalition 
government with the right wing populist party ANEL. 1 0 
28.01.2015 Prime minister Tsipras plans to stop privatizations, reemploy 
civils servants, raise the minimum wage and minimum 
pensions and renegotiate the credit conditions. 
1 -1 
31.01.2015 New Greek government announces to end the cooperation 
with the Troika. 1 -1 
02.02.2015 The Greek minister of finance Varoufakis releases a schedule 
for a solution of the debt crisis.  1 0 
03.02.2015 Varoufakis propose longer maturities and lower interest rates 
for Greek debt instead of haircut. 1 -1 
04.02.2015 ECB does not accept Greek government bonds as collaterals for 
central bank credits. 1 -1 
07.02.2015 Rating Standard & Poor’s: Downgrade 1 -1 
11.02.2015 No agreement between Varoufakis and ministers of finance of 
the euro zone about an prolongation of the rescue package. 1 -1 
12.02.2015 Greek government misses its budget targets. 1 0 
16.02.2015 Meeting of the Eurogroup with Greece leads to no agreement. 1 0 
19.02.2015 Greece requests for prolongation of the financial aid by six 
months.  1 0 
20.02.2015 Eurogroup and Greece agree to a four-month prolongation of 
the financial aid. The Eurogroup demands that Greece presents 
a list of detailed reforms. 
1 1 
24.02.2015 The ministers of finance of the eurozone approve prolongation 
of the financial aid after presentation of the reform list. 1 1 
27.02.2015 The German parliament votes for the prolongation of the 
financial aid. 1 0 
27.06.2015 Prime minister Tsipras breaks off negotiations and schedules a 
referendum on a bailout agreement, to be held on 5 July 2015. 
This announcement leads to capital controls. 
1 -1 
05.07.2015 The Greek bailout referendum is held. Over 61% vote to reject 
the proposed measures by the EU, the ECB and the IMF.  1 -1 
11.07.2015 The Greek parliament approves the government proposal 
about bailout plan. 1 0 
12.07.2015 Agreement between the Eurozone heads of government upon 
negotiations about a third rescue package. 1 1 
16.07.2015 The Greek Parliament approves the first round of measures 
required by the creditors, including changes to pensions and 
taxes. Violent protests 
1 1 
20.07.2015 Greek banks open again, but capital controls remain. The 
Greek government repays two loans to the IMF and ECB. 1 1 
23.07.2015 The Greek parliament approves the second set of bailout 
measures 1 1 
03.08.2015 The Greek Stock Exchange reopened after being closed since 
25 June and fell more than 16% with bank stocks losing an 
average of 30% in a single day's trading 
1 0 
19.08.2015 The ministers of finance of the eurozone approve the third 
rescue package with a volume of €86 billion. 1 1 
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20.08.2015 Prime minister Tsipras resigns and announces new election in 
September. 1 0 
24.08.2015 The Chinese stock market crash affects Greece. The Greek 
Stock Exchange fell 10.54% 1 -1 
20.09.2015 SYRIZA wins the Greek parliamentary elections. Tsipras 
continues its coalition government with ANEL. 1 0 
19.11.2015 The government passes a new austerity package.  0 1 
 
Events during the Greek debt crisis 2009-2015. Codifying of the event and media coverage. Is on the day 
of the event or the five preceding or following days any date among the dates with the 15 percent highest 
media coverage? above=1, below=0. Codifying of the event as “Good news” or “Bad news” for an investor 
investing in Greece: positive=1, negative=-1, no classification=0. 29 
 
  
                                                          
29 Main source of events: Seferlis/Lagaria, The Chronicle. We further considered the timeline of events in the Greek 
debt crisis from Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-economy-timeline/timeline-
greeces-economic-crisis-idUSTRE62230T20100303, 06.12.2017), Wikipedia (articles on the “Greek government-
debt crisis”, the “European debt crisis”, the “Great recession and 2000s European sovereign debt crisis timeline”, 




A.3 Regression Results using levels of the bond yield as dependent variable 
 
Table A.3.1: Regression results news coverage 
 
Results of regressing the Greek bond yield (levels) on the daily average share of the Greek debt crisis topic 
and lags of both series (see Equation (4), but using levels instead of changes of the bond yield). Time period: 
January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
Table A.3.2: Regression results events 
  
Results of regressing levels of the Greek bond yield on event dummy series and lags of both series (see 
Equation (5), but using levels instead of changes of the bond yield). Time period: January 1st, 2009 to 
December 31st, 2015. 
Independent Variable: 
Media coverage
Dependent (Greek Debt crisis topic)
Variable: Bond yield (1)
X 0.09
L(X, 1) 0.01





Variable: Bond yield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.14  0.24 ** -0.02 0.14
L(D, 1) -0.12 -0.18 -0.05 -0.03
L(D, 2)  -0.15 *  -0.28 ** 0.02 0.15
L(D, 3) 0.14  0.20 * 0.03 -0.003
L(D, 4) 0.05 0.11 -0.03 0.14
L(D, 5) 0.11  0.19 * -0.01 0.07
L(Y, 1) 0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***
Constant 0.09 **  0.10 **  0.09 **  0.09 **  
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817












Table A.3.3: Regression results positive and negative events (as compared to all events) 
   
Results from regressing levels of the Greek bond yield on dummy series of favorable and unfavorable events 
and lags of both series (see Equation (5), but using levels instead of changes of the bond yield). Time period: 
January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
Dependent 
Variable: Bond yield (1) (2) (3)
D 0.14 0.05 0.34 **
L(D, 1) -0.12 -0.49 *** 0.21
L(D, 2)  -0.15 * -0.51 *** 0.27 **
L(D, 3) 0.14 0.25 ** -0.05
L(D, 4) 0.05 0.01 0.08
L(D, 5) 0.11 0.27 ** 0.02
L(Y, 1)  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***
Constant  0.09 **  0.09 **  0.09 **
Observations 1817 1817 1817









Table A.3.4: Regression results positive and negative events with or without news coverage 
 
Results from regressing levels of the Greek bond yield on sub-series of favorable and unfavorable events 
and lags of both series (see Equation (5), but using levels instead of changes of the bond yield). Time period: 




Variable: Bond yield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.18  0.55 *** -0.15 0.05
L(D, 1)  -0.69 ***  0.38 *** -0.09 -0.01
L(D, 2)  -0.80 ***  0.38 *** 0.05 0.11
L(D, 3)  0.38 *** -0.11 0.04 -0.002
L(D, 4) 0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.05
L(D, 5)  0.43 0.05 -0.01 -0.02
L(Y, 1)  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***
Constant  0.08 **  0.11 ***  0.09 **  0.09 **  
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817












Table A.3.5: Regression results positive/negative media coverage on dates with no events but with news 
coverage. 
 
   
Results of regressing changes of the Greek bond yield on series of dates with high news coverage and 
favorable or unfavorable news with respect to Greece. We add lags of both series (see Equation 5)). Time 
period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2015. 
 
Dependent 
Variable: Bond yield (1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.14 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12
L(D, 1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.0003 0.04
L(D, 2) 0.15 -0.27 0.08 0.03
L(D, 3) -0.003 -0.02 0.08 -0.1
L(D, 4) 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09
L(D, 5) 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.09
L(Y, 1)  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***  0.99 ***
Constant  0.09 **  0.09 **  0.09 **  0.09 **  
Observations 1817 1817 1817 1817
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Independent Variable:
No Events No Events No Events No Events
Media Positive Media, Negative Media, Neutral Media,
